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Although psychiatry has a rich variety of models, most fail to span biological, psychological, and social 
domains. Computational psychiatry (panel) offers simple, direct ways of uniting these levels of explanation and 
analysis by providing notions that are applicable to each one.1 Computational psychiatry holds, we argue, 
serious promise for development of comprehensive explanations and treatments for psychiatric illness; it can 
provide an account of how a person interacts with and is influenced by the world and so should be closely 
aligned to cognitive approaches in the investigation and treatment of mental illness.2 We suggest much could be 
gained from harnessing the remarkable developments in computational neuroscience and the growing success in 
application of these techniques to our understanding of brain processes, cognition, and social interaction, and 
applying them to mental illness. This is the central goal of computational psychiatry, and the aim of this brief 
Viewpoint is to show its potential value. We give three linked examples relating to cognitive modelling of 
psychosis,  neurochemical investigations, and  integration of pharmacological and cognitive interventions. 
Although our focus is on psychosis and uses perspectives emerging from the field of learning and 
reinforcement, the points raised are applicable to other mental illnesses, and a great deal has been achieved with 
economic and game-theoretic perspectives.3  
Cognitive neuropsychiatry seeks an understanding of mental symptoms in terms of healthy psychological 
functions (eg, exploration of auditory hallucinations in terms of processes related to monitoring of inner 
speech).2 Computational psychiatry provides a means of refining and testing such theories, to identify key sub-
processes and, in doing so, to characterise deviations more specifically. For example, the computational 
approach characterises learning through several parameters, such as motivation, value representation, learning 
rate, confidence, exploratory behaviour, prediction error, and meta-learning.1 Armed with the ability to identify 
and measure these parameters, computational psychiatrists are in a good position to get to the heart of abnormal 
task performance and to link cognitive changes to behaviour and symptoms. 
As an example, the jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias is invoked as an explanatory mechanism in models of 
delusions.4 When people with schizophrenia (who have or are prone to delusions) make decisions in an 
uncertain setting, they tend to draw on less information in reaching that decision than does a person without 
schizophrenia. They might also ignore pieces of evidence that contradict that decision. Langdon and colleagues 
suggested that this “bias towards hasty decisions may contribute to the formation of delusions…”5. However, 
although the bias is invoked in this way to explain delusions, it is not specific6 and, alone, its explanatory value 
is very restricted. Delusions are beliefs reached without strong objective evidence supporting them. Thus, 
portrayal of people with delusions as having a JTC bias is a redescription rather than an explanation. We should 
explore the underlying information processing in terms that relate to other levels of analysis. Computational 
psychiatry is thus essential if progress is to be made. 
By exploring the bias more deeply, in terms of underlying information processing, psychiatrists can move 
towards other levels of enquiry and to the brain. For example, the JTC bias might arise because of altered noise 
in decision making.7 Ideas of noise in a system that is concerned with prediction and inference link directly to 
predictive coding theory, which asserts that the brain strives to predict the world and optimise its predictions by 
minimising errors.8 Within this framework, the brain is a model of its world, recapitulating in its structure and 
function past experiences of regularities. The brain infers the causes of its inputs on the basis of such experience 
and tests its inferences by making predictions about ensuing inputs. To function successfully in this way, actual 
inputs should be compared with expectations. Mismatches are signalled and minimised in several possible 
ways: they can be ignored (experiencing what we expect rather than what is presented by our senses), changed 
(altering the world to fit expectation), or updated (a changed model of the world).  Error minimisation can be 
seen as a core principle of survival (avoid surprises to stay alive)8, and we propose that anomalies in the genesis 
of prediction error, its nature, and our responses to it can explain the emergence of psychosis. In the early 
phases of psychosis, the world becomes a strange, unpredictable place, with complex, distressing, and socially 
isolating experiences.9 Predictive coding models explain these experiences as attempts to account for and 
minimise uncertainty.10 
The idea central to predictive coding (that present input is shaped and interpreted by appealing to stored 
experience) is not new to psychiatry but computational psychiatry offers richer perspectives on phenomena such 
as the JTC bias and, crucially, links them (figure 1) to underlying brain processes without ignoring or 
sacrificing high level factors such as emotions, interpersonal interactions, and culture.12 This information should 
be especially useful to the clinician, who struggles with the challenge of understanding and treating symptoms 
by combination of knowledge of the neurochemical, cognitive, and social domains. Computational Psychiatry is 
not just an academic exercise: if, for example, the JTC bias is a target for cognitive therapeutic intervention, a 
profound difference would exist between an approach guided by the knowledge that the anomaly occurred at the 
point of decision making and one that presumed an antipathy towards gathering of information.  
The previous example offers a perspective on psychosis that is predominantly related to cognition and 
information processing. We can also, albeit imprecisely, re-express the predictive coding model in 
pharmacological terms, relating perturbed dopamine transmission to psychosis via disrupted learning 
mechanisms,12–14 thus linking psychotic experiences to neurochemistry.10 In simplified terms, predictive coding 
includes top-down signalling via N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) glutamate receptors and bottom-up (prediction 
error) signalling via α-amino-3-hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazole-propionic acid (AMPA) receptors.15  Dopamine 
modulates the prediction error signal, enhancing its gain.16 We speculate that the system’s fundamental role of 
minimisation of prediction error and uncertainty could be perturbed by altered NMDA-mediated processing 
(leading to a failure of previous beliefs to constrain present experience) and altered AMPA processing 
associated with a change in bottom-up messages (leading to noise in the system that previous beliefs would 
have difficulty in minimising).10 Moreover, altered dopamine signalling could give undue weight to these 
bottom-up signals. Pharmacological modelling of delusions with the psychotomimetic NMDA receptor 
antagonist ketamine provides a clue to how those perturbations are manifest biologically, through a loss of of 
the influence top-down priors  (NMDA receptor blockade) and an enhancement of prediction error signalling 
(increased AMPA receptor transmission).17  
With a growing and ever more nuanced understanding of the association between pharmacology and cognition, 
interventions could be designed empirically and particular patients could be offered particular treatment 
approaches dependent on the points at which they diverge from the model. For example, we know that key 
drivers of earning - prediction error and attentional salience18  are mediated by separate but interacting 
neurotransmitter systems (dopamine and acetylcholine)
20,21
. Disruptions to both processes (prediction error and 
attentional salience attribution) can manifest in behaviour as aberrant learning and, ultimately, delusional 
beliefs.
10
 A patient might experience delusions because of a disruption to either system.
10
 The behavioural, 
neural, and algorithmic metrics derived from fitting a learning model to that person’s brain and behavioural data 
would allow a clinician to ascribe their problem to either prediction error or attentional salience. A drug (or 
psychological treatment or combination treatment) could then be chosen for that patient that addressed their 
specific neurochemical dysfunction. In this way, Computational psychiatry allows us to marshal the advances in 
neuroscience and computation to tackle the heterogeneity of underlying pathophysiology that attends serious 
mental illnesses. 
One puzzling characteristic of delusions is that, although they are fixed and impervious to contradictory 
evidence, they can nevertheless show remarkable elasticity, expanding to incorporate contradictory evidence in 
such a way that the delusional belief is strengthened rather than relinquished. This characteristic can be 
considered within the predictive coding framework, where prediction error might lead to an updated belief or 
might be suppressed.22 We can relate this to animal conditioning: when an animal is exposed to pairings 
between an environmental stimulus (eg, a tone) and a salient event (eg, an electric shock), it learns that the tone 
predicts the shock. If the tone is then presented in the absence of shock, extinction learning occurs. The 
animal’s behaviour can be thought of as being mediated by a competition between its previous learning and its 
new experiences.23 This balance between extinction and reconsolidation of memories might be disrupted in 
people with psychosis, such that there is reduced extinction learning and possibly even belief-strengthening on 
extinction trials.22  
 
This theory has important therapeutic potential. Cognitive behavioural therapy could guide new extinction 
learning.22 The therapist encourages the patient to consider and adopt alternative explanations for their psychotic 
experiences. Viewed according to the computational tenets outlined in figure 1, cognitive behavioural therapy 
would be acting at the algorithmic level to encourage a different balance between representations, such that a 
new, non-psychotic belief prevails. In a 2011 investigation24, participants given D-cycloserine (which boosts 
NMDA receptor function) after cognitive behavioural therapy showed an enhanced adoption of new explanatory 
beliefs compared with those who received placebo. This finding is readily comprehensible within a 
computational framework but less easily so within more restricted single level models. 
 
Computational psychiatry has limitations.  A recent review1, stated that “much of the literature that substantiates 
the points we make has yet to appear”. Although this fact is undeniable, we suggest that there are already 
profound insights enshrined in the computational psychiatry approach that are of direct relevance to the 
practising psychiatrist. These take the form of a desire to harness the emerging insights from cognitive 
neuroscience, a belief that such insights are of far more than academic interest and a dissatisfaction with 
explanations that fail to go beyond single levels (whether neurobiological, cognitive, or social).. Computational 
psychiatry is about modelling the brain in the world (indeed, it is about modelling how the brain models the 
world or even about modelling how the brain models how other brains model the world). As George Box said, 
all models are wrong, the question is how useful they are.25 So, Bayesian analysis should not be conflated with 
Bayesian processing.26 That is, Bayesian methods can be used to analyse data without the neural or cognitive 
system that engender those data necessarily being Bayesian.26 And even if a Bayesian model provides a good fit 
for the data generated, that does not mean that the system functions in a Bayesian manner. There have been 
many examples in which Bayesian models can account for the neural data.27 However, such examples are subtly 
different from proof of how the system works. One prediction of the Bayesian model of psychosis that was 
borne out by the data is the division of labour in glutamate receptor signalling between bottom-up (AMPA) and 
top-down (NMDA). This prediction was supported with neurophysiological recording in awake, behaving 
monkeys.28 Clearly, more studies need to be done before this scheme determines clinical practice in psychiatry. 
However, computational psychiatry provides a means through which hypotheses can be generated and tested 
and, as such, it provides a hypothetico-deductive roadmap toward its own clinical implementation.29  
 
A computational approach to psychiatry might seem something of an indulgence, arcane, abstract, and remote 
from the questions and challenges that face clinicians and patients. Moreover, it carries unfortunate 
connotations of the mechanical, the disembodied, and the emotionless. Such a view is wrong. In more than most 
fields, Computational psychiatry strives towards a truly biopsychosocial perspective by showing how each level 
of analysis (through neurons, circuits, cognitive processes, social interactions) can only be fully understood by 
characterising its association to other levels. Thus, the predictive coding model we have described and in figure 
1 has, at its core, the idea that the brain tries to make inferences about its world and become a model of its 
world. The brain is embedded in an environment that should be described in terms that include the social and 
the environmental. The brain makes the world and the world makes the brain.30 A view of mental illness that 
fails to take this balance into account will be incomplete. Computational psychiatry recognises this danger and 
strives to avoid it.  
  
Panel   
Computational psychiatry in a nutshell 
At its heart, computational psychiatry (computational psychiatry) holds that human experience, decision 
making, and behaviour, in all their complexity, might be understood in terms of how we build mental 
representations of the states of the world and act to influence those states as best as possible. Psychiatric illness 
and distress might be considered in terms of a failure to achieve this optimum interaction, and the challenge 
faced by computational psychiatry is to identify and quantify this suboptimal state. What is optimum might be 
established by the states and values of the individual and the state of the world. Because the world includes 
other minds and mental representations as well as complex social structures, computational psychiatry strives 
for the richest perspective possible. Computational psychiatry cannot ignore any level of analysis because each 
level contributes to the problems faced (and the solutions proposed) by the brain. 
The approach recognises that even small detrimental changes in information processing can be devastating but 
that, nonetheless, many junctures exist at which intervention might be possible; we can change the environment 
for people who are in mental distress (perhaps assisting them to find housing or employment), or we can try to 
enable them to represent appropriate parameters correctly and use those representations to guide their behaviour 
optimally (eg, with cognitive behavioural therapy). Interventions such as these are already integral to 
psychiatry, but the key idea is that, by understanding the mapping from the problem being solved to the 
machinery of problem solving, we can more systematically characterise the problems and intervene at all levels 
to ameliorate disruptions to information processing and the effects of these disruptions.  
Computational psychiatry and its debt to cognitive neuropsychiatry 
Computational psychiatry has its antecedents in cognitive neuropsychiatry.2 A review of the field defined 
computational psychiatry (in part) as “the use of formal models of brain function to characterise the 
mechanisms of psychopathology,”31 which overlaps very clearly with the approach proposed by Halligan and 
David: “let us take the best cognitive models for a range of normal psychological functions and treat them as if 
psychiatric phenomena fall within their ambit”2. Computational psychiatry, like cognitive neuropsychiatry, 
involves specification of mental symptoms as departures from healthy processing. However, computational 
psychiatry includes a formal specification of the processes and the parametric means through which they 
deviate from healthy processing; in short, unlike cognitive neuropsychiatry, computational psychiatry is both 
qualitative (which parameters change?) and quantitative (by how much?).1 
  
  
 Figure legends 
Figure: Levels of explanation  
The terms computational level, algorithmic level, and physical level are taken from an influential account of 
computing by David Marr and Tomaso Poggio.11 
The physical anatomy of the brain embodies Bayesian mechanisms of top-down prediction of sensory inputs 
and bottom-up prediction errors. This finding allows us to solve the ill-posed problems of perceptual inference 
and decision-making in noisy environments such that we can respond adaptively and flexibly to the 
contingencies in our world.  
H=hypothesis. D=data. P(H)=prior probability of H – the probability of H before seeing D. P(D)=probability of 
observing data, D. P(D|H)=likelihood – the probability of seeing D given H is true. P(H|D)=the posterior 
probability – the probability of hypothesis given the data. NMDA= N-methyl-D-aspartate. AMPA=α-amino-3-
hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazole-propionic acid. 
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